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EXAMINING DIFFERENT REASONS WHY PEOPLE ACCEPT OR REJECT      
SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS 
 
 
Emilio J. C. Lobato 
68 Pages 
The current project was designed to examine how cognitive style, cultural worldview, 
and conspiracy ideation correspond to various levels of agreement with scientific claims. 
Additionally, the kinds of justifications people provide for their position on scientific issues and 
the kinds of possible refutations of their scientific beliefs people are able to generate were 
qualitatively coded and analyzed. Participants were presented with a short survey asking about 
their level of agreement with scientific claims about biological evolution, anthropogenic climate 
change, pediatric vaccines, and genetically modified foods. Participants were asked two open-
ended questions about each topic, one prompting participants to justify their level-of-agreement 
rating and the other prompting participants to generate possible refutations to their belief. 
Participants also filled in measures of cognitive style, cultural worldview, and conspiracy 
ideation. I predicted that analytical thinking style would be associated with overall higher levels 
of agreement with scientific claims, intuitive thinking and conspiracy ideation would be 
associated with overall lower levels of agreement with scientific claims, and agreement with 
scientific claims would be a function of cultural worldview. Results showed that greater 
agreement with all four scientific claims is related to a greater predisposition to analytical 
thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. I further hypothesized that the frequency 
of distinct categories of justifications and refutations would be predicted by level of agreement 
with scientific claims. Broadly, justifications were coded as non-justifications, subjective, 
evidential, or deferential, and refutations were broadly coded as denials, subjective, evidential, or 
deferential. Results of chi-squared analysis revealed topic-specific patterns in participants’ 
reasoning, suggesting that people do not reason about scientific topics consistently. Different 
scientific claims appear, instead, to be accepted or rejected for different reasons. For example, 
evidence may be cited for one socio-scientific issue, but subjective experience or reasoning may 
be used to justify others. Regression analyses indicated further the nuanced relationship between 
explicit reasoning provided by participants and their agreement with scientific claims. Higher 
agreement with all scientific claims was related to a greater frequency of explicitly referencing 
evidence in some form, but other categories of belief justification and belief refutation showed 
topic-specific relationships. Generally, findings from this research provide a crucial next step for 
better understanding why individuals reject established science, as well as for developing more 
effective means of improving scientific literacy. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Improving scientific literacy is a major goal of 21st century education (NRC, 2010, 
2012), but the path to greater scientific literacy in the general public includes many challenges. 
Recent polls and surveys find the general public is not particularly prone to accepting scientific 
conclusions on major socio-political issues (Funk & Rainie, 2015), and that for some subgroups, 
trust in science and acceptance of science has been decreasing over the last several decades 
(Gauchat, 2012). According to one line of thinking, the primary source of resistance to science 
stems from an information deficit in the public (Gross, 1994). If that is the case, efforts to 
improve the communication of science to the public should result in a greater acceptance of 
science by the public. The logic of this approach is intuitively appealing, but the results of 
programs that attempt to address this information deficit are mixed (Miller, 2001; see also 
Gauchat, 2012). Some topics for which there is an abundance of scientific information and 
consensus, such as biological evolution and anthropogenic climate change, are still hotly 
contested by non-scientists in the public and in politics. More information has not increased 
public acceptance of science. 
Currently, researchers examining the public’s understanding of science are moving 
beyond a pure deficit model approach to understanding rejection of science. Instead, many 
researchers are investigating the role of other individual difference variables and their 
relationship to accepting or rejecting science in general, or specific socio-scientific issues in 
particular. These variables are predominantly social or cognitive in nature, rather than 
educational or knowledge-based. They include cultural worldview (e.g., Kahan, 2012, 2015), 
political ideology and affiliation (e.g., Gauchat, 2012; Nisbet, Cooper, & Garret, 2015; Shen & 
Gromet; 2015), cognitive style (e.g., Gervais, 2015; Lindeman, 2011; Majima, 2015), and 
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predisposition towards conspiracy ideation (e.g., Lewandowsky, Oberaur, & Gignac, 2013b), 
each of which will be described in more detail in the following sections. 
Results from these lines of inquiry have provided important contributions that afford the 
improvement of educational policies and science communication techniques. One limitation of 
these research efforts is that they are purely quantitative studies utilizing surveys comprised of 
true/false or Likert-scale questions. To better understand why people may accept or reject 
particular scientific claims, it is important to conduct qualitative research that allows individuals 
to elaborate on their position in addition to quantitative research to examine individual difference 
characteristics that relate to acceptance or rejection of science. That is the purpose of the current 
research. A better understanding of why people say they accept or reject science may provide 
new insight into how to convey scientific information to the general public. 
Demarcation Problem 
Before exploring the prior literature examining individual difference variables associated 
with acceptance or rejection of science, it is important to understand what science is. 
Understanding what science is and how to distinguish it from non-science or pseudoscience is a 
challenging prospect. However, a person’s understanding of what constitutes science may 
influence what topics or claims he or she considers scientific. “One’s view about whether people 
are adept at scientific thinking depends heavily on one’s view of what scientific inquiry is” 
(Koslowski, 1996, p. 3). The challenge associated with defining science and distinguishing 
science from non-science and pseudoscience is known as the demarcation problem. Interest in 
the demarcation problem has recently increased (Boudry, Blancke, & Pigliucci, 2014; Still & 
Dryden, 2004), perhaps in response to the current dialogues about specific scientific topics (e.g., 
climate change) between scholarly communities, the general public, and politicians. 
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Science is frequently treated and characterized as a set of processes and methods for 
investigating phenomena, both by scholarly communities (e.g., scientific, philosophical) and the 
general public. These processes and methods vary within and between scientific disciplines 
depending on the epistemic obligations of the discipline (Cleland, 2001; Cleland & Brindell, 
2013; McComas, 1996). For example, theoretical aspects of disciplines such as chemistry or 
physics rely heavily on calculation rather than experimentation (Bauer, 1994). Previous science 
education standards, however, were more limited in scope with respect to teaching students 
about science as a method of inquiry, focusing predominantly on “the” scientific method of 
observation, hypothesis formation, and experimentation. This view of scientific inquiry may be 
why some individuals reject the consensus view on contemporary “controversial” scientific 
topics. The predominant evidentiary weight of some scientific topics does not bear much 
resemblance to “the” scientific method that was taught in primary and secondary education for 
generations. For example, historical field sciences, such as geology, cannot conduct experiments 
on hypothesized events that occurred in the past. Instead, field geologists examine the results of 
historical geological events, and exploit the fundamental cause-effect asymmetry to determine 
which hypothesized events are most probable given the collected evidence (Cleland, 2001; 
Cleland & Brindell, 2013). 
However, science can also be characterized as a rich and diverse set of content areas. 
Regardless of the processes one uses, some topics or ideas are not susceptible to true scientific 
investigation. For example, Bem (2011) published a series of studies that purported to find 
positive evidence for psi phenomena, such as precognition and premonition. The predominant 
responses from the skeptical scientific community tended to criticize the methodological and 
analytic factors of Bem’s work (e.g., Rouder & Morey, 2011). Failures to replicate Bem’s results 
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were used to argue that the notion of psi phenomena is, at best, problematic from a research 
design perspective. However, as pointed out by Schwarzkopf (2014), well-established research 
findings in thermodynamics about the arrow of causality mean that there is no reason to assume 
such phenomena (i.e., psi) could possibly exist for which testable hypotheses could be 
developed. Psychic abilities violate fundamental thermodynamic properties of the known 
universe, and accepting the premise of psychic abilities undermines the foundation of the modern 
understanding of causal relationships. Schwarzkopf’s reasoning rests on there being boundaries 
of what can and cannot be considered scientific content. These boundaries are themselves usually 
created, maintained, or dissolved through the results of prior empirical investigation. 
A similar position for demarcating science from pseudoscience was articulated by 
Pigliucci (2013). He suggests there are at least two broad attributes that distinguish science from 
pseudoscience. These attributes are breadth of internal coherence and depth of empirical 
knowledge. Internal coherence refers to the logical consistency among a set of propositions that 
gives rise to the explanatory power of a theoretical view (see for review, Thagard, 1989). The 
processes and contents of science could be seen as making up the depth of empirical knowledge 
attribute. Theoretical understanding and internal coherence ideally form a reciprocal relationship 
with the establishment of empirical knowledge. Coherence both extends and constrains the 
methods and contents of a given scientific discipline, which themselves expand and limit the 
scope of subsequent theoretical understanding. 
Although the above review is necessarily incomplete, it provides a means to introduce 
and define the construct of science for the purposes of grounding the present research. 
Classifying something as science (or scientific) depends partly on the characteristics of both the 
content examined and the methods used, broadly speaking. Therefore, science is a heavily 
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constrained category, requiring both a theoretically appropriate content area and associated set of 
rigorous methodologies that produce internally coherent explanations for natural phenomena 
(Pigliucci, 2013; Shtulman, 2013). This conceptualization of science can be useful in examining 
why some people accept scientific claims while others reject them. Acceptance or rejection of 
scientific claims may depend on the methodologies associated with investigating that topic, the 
content under investigation, or based on some other reasons unrelated to the demarcation 
problem. For the current study, analyzing the reasons people provide for their belief in scientific 
topics such as evolution, climate change, genetically-modified organisms (GMO), and pediatric 
vaccinations provide a window into what characteristics of scientific issues are salient to 
individuals who accept or reject scientific views on these issues. 
Dual Process Models of Belief 
Cognitive science research on belief has been aided by the recent incorporation of dual-
process models of cognition. Dual-process models posit that information processing can occur in 
two distinct ways (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). One mode of processing is typically 
automatic, rapid, and based on heuristics. This is frequently termed System 1 or Type 1 
processing. The other mode of processing, System 2 or Type 2 processing, is described as a more 
reflective, analytical, and slower way to process information. However, these characteristics are 
not always present when engaging in Type 1 or Type 2 processing. Instead, these features are 
thought to just frequently co-occur with a more narrow and specific defining characteristic of 
Type 1 and Type 2 processing: Type 1 processing is characteristically autonomous whereas Type 
2 processing is uniquely capable of cognitively decoupling mental representations after 
inhibiting autonomous Type 1 processing (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). 
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A dual-process framework has been utilized in multiple distinct lines of research 
investigating scientific and paranormal beliefs (Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015; Gervais, 2015; 
Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lobato et al., 2014; Lobato & Zimmerman, 2015; 
Majima, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). Taken together, findings 
from these studies suggest that a greater predisposition towards engaging in the analytical Type 2 
processing is correlated with less endorsement of scientifically inaccurate or epistemically 
unwarranted beliefs. In contrast, a greater predisposition towards engaging in the intuitive Type 
1 processing is correlated with a higher rate of belief in less scientifically or philosophically 
coherent phenomena. This research implies that people’s beliefs about scientific topics may be 
influenced by their predisposition towards Type 1 or Type 2 information processing. 
Justifications for Views on Scientific Topics 
The importance of understanding why people accept or reject scientific claims is 
illustrated in the diverse research efforts to examine variables that may affect an individual’s 
belief system. Equally relevant is research examining how people justify their belief system 
about scientific issues. 
Recent research indicates that college students’ justifications for their beliefs in scientific 
and paranormal phenomena are not qualitatively distinct (Shtulman, 2013). In this research, 140 
student participants were asked about their beliefs in six scientific phenomena (e.g., electrons, 
evolution, genes) and 12 paranormal entities (e.g., angels, ghosts, karma). Participants responded 
to five prompts, investigating whether they believed in the existence of these phenomena, how 
confident they were, how many other Americans they thought held the same belief, why they 
hold the belief that they do (i.e., belief justifications), and what evidence might persuade them to 
change their mind (i.e., belief refutations). Open-ended responses to the questions probing belief 
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justifications and belief refutations were coded along a hierarchical decision tree (see Figure 1). 
This coding scheme began with differentiating responses that actually answered the questions 
from responses that either clarified the respondent’s position (for the belief justification prompt) 
or denied any possibility for evidence to change the respondent’s position (for the belief 
refutation prompt). From there, justification responses were further sorted into those that 
referenced internal, subjective rationales and those that referenced external, objective rationales. 
External, objective rationales were further deconstructed into responses that mentioned 
evidential justifications – such as empirically observable properties or testable causal effects – 
and responses that mentioned deferential justifications – such as appeals to authority or personal 
worldview cohesion. Analysis of the sample’s belief justifications and belief refutations revealed 
similarity between beliefs in scientific phenomena and paranormal entities. Both sets of beliefs 
were predominantly justified by deferential justifications and for both sets of beliefs the majority 
of participants denied the possibility of their belief being refuted. Even though the methodology 
of the study prompted students to think in terms of evidence, most did not provide evidential 
reasons. These results support the idea that many college students may not perceive scientific 
beliefs as having a qualitatively distinct, more rigorous set of epistemological commitments than 
non-scientific beliefs such as paranormal beliefs. 
For both scientific and non-scientific beliefs, many people do not appear to conceptualize 
their belief as two distinct representations of the theory and any corroborating evidence, instead 
combining theory and corroborating evidence in a single representation. That is, “evidence 
serves merely to illustrate what one knows to be true, with evidence-based and theory-based 
justifications functioning as interchangeable supports for a claim” (Kuhn, 1999, p. 21). As such, 
people may re-state a belief as its own justification. If a single representation is used for both 
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belief and justification for the belief, people may struggle to come up with reasons for why they 
hold the beliefs they do and instead resort to circular reasoning. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Coding scheme used in Shtulman (2013). From “Epistemic similarities 
between students' scientific and supernatural beliefs,” by A. Shtulman, 2013, 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 105, p. 203. Copyright 2013 by American 
Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
Cultural and Community Ideology 
The framing of scientific issues also matters for understanding why people adhere to the 
beliefs they do regarding science. Framing affects how a topic is received (Levin, Schneider, & 
Gaeth, 1998). For example, Barnes and Church (2013) examined the frequency of the terms 
proof, evidence, establish, experiment, test, and trial in documents arguing in favor of 
creationism/Intelligent Design (ID) or evolution. Their analyses revealed that proponents of 
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creationism/ID were approximately three times more likely than proponents of evolution to 
utilize cognates of proof (e.g., proved, proven) in their arguments. Authors arguing for 
creationism/ID were also approximately three times more likely to frame the issue of evolution 
in absolute terms, expressing certainty that questions regarding evolution and the origin of life 
could be proven (and that the proof is entirely in favor of creationist/ID arguments). The 
researchers argued that such a finding indicates there may be ideological group differences in the 
epistemological commitments of science between proponents of creationism/ID and proponents 
of evolutionary theory. As such, the reasons that individuals provide for believing what they do 
about specific scientific issues may help reveal how they generally understand science. This 
research also suggests that people who reject science may be more likely to frame their position 
in terms of certainty or provability, in contrast to the probabilistic nature of appropriate scientific 
inquiry. 
Similarly, research also indicates that how scientific issues are framed affects how much 
individuals affiliated with different political parties support an issue. Shen and Gromet (2015) 
investigated how advances in neuroscience that influence legal and public policy (i.e., 
“neurolaw”) are received by the general public. In a preliminary study examining the public’s 
current understanding of how neuroscience impacts the law, the researchers found that most 
participants mentioned aspects of criminal trials such as lie detection or assessments of a 
defendant’s sanity. In a subsequent study with a nationally representative sample of 1,010 
participants, the researchers manipulated whether the question about acceptance of neuroscience 
in the legal system was framed in support of prosecutors or defendants. The researchers found 
that although the general public is predominantly neutral to the topic of neurolaw, how the issue 
is framed reveals partisan differences in acceptance. In particular, individuals affiliated with the 
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Republican Party were less supportive of neurolaw when the issue was framed as benefitting the 
legal defense side of trials. In contrast, individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party were 
unaffected by how neurolaw was framed. 
Whereas Shen and Gromet (2015) found the public largely neutral on the topic of 
neurolaw, perhaps due to the perceived complicated nature of neuroscience advances, similar 
partisan divides in accepting science are found for topics that have seeped into cultural and 
political discourse, including evolution, climate change, hydraulic fracturing (fracking), and 
nuclear power (Nisbet et al., 2015). When presented with ideologically dissonant scientific 
communications, more people engage in motivated cognition, regardless of their political 
ideology or orientation, compared to individuals presented with science communications that 
were ideologically neutral or favorable. Here, motivated cognition refers to the phenomenon by 
which individuals selectively interpret information provided to them in ways that are congruent 
with their prior beliefs or values (Kunda, 1990). That motivated cognition occurs for political 
liberals as well as political conservatives suggests that the role of ideology in resistance to 
science may depend on the specific topic being considered rather than a generalized resistance to 
science. Similar results of content-specific partisan differences are found in studies investigating 
the degree to which individuals value deference to scientific expertise in policy formation (Blank 
& Shaw, 2015).  
Further, the role of ideology and community identity may be more important to one’s 
position on a scientific issue than one’s content-relevant knowledge. For example, historically, 
distrust in science within the United States between political groups – Democrat, Republican, 
independent – varies as a function of which political party wins presidential elections (Gauchat, 
2012). Trust in science by Democrats and Independents has remained stable since the mid-1970s, 
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whereas for Republicans trust in science falls sharply with the election of conservative 
Republican presidents. Rejection of science and endorsement of pseudoscience is also predicted 
by religious affiliation, with religious participants showing a higher level of rejection of science 
and acceptance of pseudoscience than non-religious participants (Lobato et al., 2014). Kahan 
(2012, 2015) has argued that discussions of certain scientific topics, such as climate change, are 
tightly associated with one’s cultural identity, including religious or political affiliation. This 
association between a particular opinion or belief about the issue of climate change and one’s 
cultural identity has complicated the transmission of relevant scientific data, as well as the 
measurement of the public’s understanding of scientific topics, because it results in individuals 
engaging in a form of motivated cognition that Kahan (2015; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, 
& Rachlinski, 2012) refers to as cultural cognition. Cultural cognition manifests itself in 
individuals’ attempts to establish congruence between the commitments of groups they belong to 
and the perception of related facts. Group identity is more personally salient, resulting in the 
perception of related facts in a manner that fits with the identity.  
Kahan and colleagues (Kahan & Braman, 2006; Kahan et al., 2012) argue that cultural 
cognition is a combination of two orthogonal dimensions: individualism-communitarianism and 
hierarchy-egalitarianism. A high individualistic worldview promotes the expectation that people 
should be free to regulate themselves in the pursuits of their own needs. A high communitarian 
worldview promotes the needs of the community as superseding the needs of individuals, the 
goal of which is to develop a society that affords opportunities for individual success. A high 
hierarchical worldview seeks to protect traditional authority and role stratification. A high 
egalitarian worldview denies the value of role stratification, seeing it as inherently risking society 
falling victim to the actions of private industry and to the traditional prejudices of authority. 
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Where individuals align on these two dimensions influences how information is filtered and 
interpreted, resulting in occasions where two people of opposing cultural worldviews can view 
the same information yet come to wildly incongruent, potentially antagonistic, conclusions. 
Thus, it would be unsurprising if people provide justifications for their scientific beliefs by 
referencing either a culture or community they belong to or a culture or community whose values 
they oppose. 
Conspiracy Ideation 
Research has found that the degree to which individuals accept science is negatively 
associated with acceptance of conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberaur, 2013a; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2013b; Lobato et al., 2014; Lobato & Zimmerman, 2015). Conspiracy 
ideation is generally regarded as a self-sustaining worldview comprised of alternative 
explanations for large-scale events endorsed by individuals who harbor a general distrust in 
recognized authorities, particularly governments (Goertzel, 1994; Wood, Douglas, Sutton, 2011). 
It is not surprising, then, that conspiracy theorists also tend to reject the conclusions of 
mainstream scientific authorities (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency) on issues ranging from climate change to 
vaccination safety. The association between conspiracy ideation and rejection of science suggests 
that individuals prompted to justify their beliefs on specific scientific issues may allude to the 
possibility of conspiracies. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The above broad overview of the nature of science, dual-process models of cognition, 
belief justifications, cultural worldview and ideology, and conspiracy ideation provide a 
necessary grounding for the present research. Qualitative measures will be analyzed in 
13 
conjunction with quantitative measures to explore the relationship between select individual 
difference variables found relevant to scientific literacy, level of agreement with scientific 
claims, and justifications provided for those beliefs about scientific claims. 
The first research question this research aims to answer is: Which individual difference 
characteristics predict acceptance or rejection of scientific claims? Based on the literature 
reviewed above, I hypothesized that cognitive style, cultural worldview (including political 
ideology and religiosity), and predisposition to conspiracy ideation would influence individuals’ 
level of agreement with scientific claims about evolution, climate change, GMO safety, and 
vaccine safety. Specifically, I hypothesized that: 
(H1a) A greater predisposition towards an analytical, Type 2 cognitive style would 
predict a higher level of agreement with scientific claims. 
(H1b) A greater predisposition towards an intuitive, Type 1 cognitive style would predict 
a lower level of agreement with scientific claims. 
(H1c) A greater predisposition to conspiracy ideation would predict a lower level of 
agreement with scientific claims. 
(H1d) Stronger political conservatism would predict a lower level of agreement with 
scientific claims about evolution and climate change relative to level of agreement with scientific 
claims about vaccine and GMO safety. 
(H1e) Stronger political liberalism would predict a lower level of agreement with 
scientific claims about vaccine and GMO safety relative to level of agreement with scientific 
claims about evolution and climate change. 
(H1f) More frequent attendance of religious services would predict a lower level of 
agreement with scientific claims about evolution. 
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The second research question: What reasons do people provide when asked to justify 
their acceptance or rejection of scientific claims? Put another way, when considering the various 
categories of reasons an individual may have for believing as he or she does (e.g., cultural 
identity, perceptions of the nature of science, evidence), how do individuals differ as a function 
of their level of agreement with scientific claims? Shtulman’s (2013) research suggests that 
justifications provided for scientific and paranormal beliefs are qualitatively similar. However, 
his research examined only college undergraduates and did not have a sufficient number of 
participants who rejected scientific claims, making a comparison between those who accept 
scientific claims and those who reject scientific claims difficult. Likewise, participants in his 
study were asked about the existence or non-existence of both scientific and paranormal 
phenomena, whereas in the current research I examine participant responses to scientific 
conclusions. 
My hypothesis was, broadly, that there would be significant differences in the proportion 
of scientifically and philosophically acceptable justifications that participants provide. 
Specifically, I hypothesized: 
(H2a) There would be fewer scientifically or philosophically acceptable justifications 
compared to justifications that are not scientifically or philosophically acceptable across all 
topics and levels of agreement with scientific claims. 
(H2b) Higher levels of agreement with scientific claims would predict more frequent 
scientifically or philosophically acceptable justifications. 
(H2c) Participants’ justifications would be predicted by their cultural worldview along the 
individualistic-egalitarianism and hierarchical-communitarian dimensions. 
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The third research question the current research was designed to answer is: Do 
individuals who accept scientific claims differ from individuals who reject scientific claims in 
their ability to consider challenges to their belief? Embedded in this research question is the 
possibility that some individuals may be unable or unwilling to consider that sufficient evidence 
could be presented to challenge their position on a subject. As such, there are two general 
hypotheses to consider. One concerns the possibility that participants will not be able to generate 
refutations or challenges to their position on scientific issues: 
(H3) The most common response to the belief refutation questions would be that there is 
no reason the participant can think of to challenge his or her position on the issue. 
The final hypothesis concerns individuals who are able to generate reasons that challenge 
their level of agreement with the scientific claims. For these individuals, I hypothesized that 
there would be significant differences in the proportion of scientifically and philosophically 
acceptable justifications that participants provide. Specifically, I hypothesized that: 
(H4a) There would be fewer references to scientifically or philosophically acceptable 
refutations compared to refutations that are not scientifically or philosophically acceptable across 
all topics and level of agreement with scientific claims. 
(H4b) Higher levels of agreement with scientific claims would predict more frequent 
references to scientifically or philosophically acceptable refutations. 
(H4c) Participants’ refutations would be predicted by their worldview along the 
individualistic-egalitarianism and hierarchical-communitarian dimensions.  
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CHAPTER II: METHOD 
Participants 
The original sample included 305 participants. After excluding participants who failed 
attention checks, and multiple data sets that originated from the same IP address, the final sample 
consisted of 244 participants with data that could be subjected to quantitative analysis and 239 
participants with data that could be subjected to qualitative analysis. 
Participants were recruited from the Illinois State University Psychology Department 
SONA Systems participant pool (N = 157), and the Illinois State University Computer 
Infrastructure and Support Services (CISS) system (N = 87). Participants recruited via SONA 
systems were compensated via course credit. Participants recruited via CISS were directed to a 
separate survey where they could enter their e-mail address to be entered into a raffle for a $25 
Amazon.com gift card. 
A preliminary power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) with effect sizes from previous research (Lobato et al., 2014; Lobato & Zimmerman, 
2015) calculated a minimum sample size of 138 participants for a predicted effect size f2 = .15, α 
= .05, and power (1 – β) = .95.  
Materials 
A survey was designed using the Qualtrics online survey software 
(http://www.qualtrics.com). The survey included a brief description of four scientific claims, and 
participants were asked to report their level of agreement with each using a six-point rating scale. 
Following that, participants were asked two open-ended questions designed to assess their 
justifications for their position and what they think about the possibility of disconfirming 
evidence for their position (see Appendix A). 
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The four topic areas for this research are: (1) biological evolution; (2) anthropogenic 
climate change; (3) genetically modified foods; and (4) vaccine efficacy. Each topic was selected 
for its prominence in contemporary discussions about the general public’s level of scientific 
literacy within scholarly disciplines, political discourse, and popular culture at large. Due to the 
prevalence of these topics in both political and popular discourse compared to other scientific 
topics, there exists a large disconnect between how the general public feels about these issues 
compared to how the relevant scientific communities feel about them. For example, although 
88% of scientists from the American Association for the Advancement of Science agree that 
genetically modified foods are safe to eat, only 37% of adults in the United States agree with that 
conclusion (Funk & Rainie, 2015). Additionally, these topics were selected because of the 
stereotypical media portrayal of two topics, evolution and climate change, as being resisted more 
by political conservatives whereas the other two topics, GMO and vaccine safety, are portrayed 
as more likely to be resisted by political liberals. 
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI, see Appendix B, Norris & Epstein, 2011) is a 
measure of predisposition towards Type 1 and Type 2 thinking. This version of the REI has four 
subscales (Rational, Imaginative, Emotional, Intuitive), but only the Rational and Intuitive 
subscales were analyzed for this study. Internal reliability for these subscales was found 
acceptable (α = .85 for the Rational subscale; α = .72 for the Intuitive subscale). 
The Cultural Worldview Scale (CWS, see Appendix C; Kahan et al., 2012) is a measure 
of cultural worldview along the dimensions of Individualism-Communitarianism and Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism. Internal reliability for these subscales was deemed unacceptable (α = .52 for the 
Individualism-Communitarianism subscale; α = .59 for the Hierarchy-Egalitarianism subscale). 
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As a result, this scale was not used in any analyses. For a full explanation of why, and possible 
reasons why reliability was so low, see Chapter IV: General Discussion. 
The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; see Appendix D; Bruder, Haffke, 
Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013) is a measure of predisposition towards conspiracy ideation. 
Internal reliability for this scale was found acceptable (Cronbach’s α = .74). 
Lastly, a demographics questionnaire was administered asking about age, gender identity, 
religious affiliation, frequency of religious service attendance, political ideology, and political 
affiliation (see Appendix E). 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with a survey asking them to rate their level of agreement 
with four scientific claims on a 6-point Likert scale. After providing their level of agreement, 
participants were then asked to provide typed responses to two open-ended questions about their 
justification for, and possible refutations of, their position on each of the four topics. 
Specifically, to investigate what reasons participants use to justify their position, they were 
asked, “What are your reasons for your position on this topic?” To investigate what reasons, if 
any, participants can imagine that could challenge their position, participants were asked, “What 
possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]?” Participants were 
then asked to complete the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Norris & Epstein, 2011), the 
Cultural Worldview Scale (Kahan et al., 2012), and the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire 
(Bruder, et al., 2013). 
Presentation of the survey of scientific claims and the individual difference 
questionnaires were counterbalanced across participants. It is possible that being asked to reflect 
on one’s reasons for their beliefs may engage metacognitive processes (Kuhn, 2000), influencing 
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how participants respond to the individual difference questionnaires. Likewise, it is possible that 
the individual difference questionnaires may prime participants to already be thinking in terms of 
their intuitions, their cultural worldview, or conspiracies, influencing what kinds of justifications 
they may provide when prompted to. Finally, participants filled out a demographics 
questionnaire. 
Coding Justifications and Refutations 
From the 239 participants who provided responses to any of the two open-ended 
questions for the four topics, there was a total of 1,425 responses to the justification question 
(324 for the Evolution item, 344 for the Climate Change item, 395 for the GMO item, and 362 
for the Vaccine item). Participants provided a total of 967 responses to the refutation question 
(247 for the Evolution item, 240 for the Climate Change item, 239 for the GMO item, and 241 
for the Vaccine item).  
A coding scheme was developed guided by the grounded theory approach to qualitative 
research (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Grounded theory is an integrated analytical approach that 
“allows researchers to identify relevant concepts, validate them, and explore them more fully in 
terms of their properties and dimensions” (p. 69). A preliminary coding scheme was developed 
in anticipation of participant responses based on a review of the relevant literatures on the 
science, history, and philosophy of science (e.g., Boudry & Braeckman, 2011, 2012), as well as 
the research scientific literacy and scientific thinking (e.g., Kuhn, 2009; Munro, 2010; 
Zimmerman, Bisanz, & Bisanz, 1998; Shtulman, 2013) summarized earlier, and personal 
communications with scholarly experts on scientific literacy (e.g., C. Zimmerman). This 
preliminary scheme was modified iteratively throughout the coding process (see Appendix F for 
the final coding scheme). 
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The codes developed for the present data were also categorized into “higher-order” 
categories in line with the coding scheme developed by Shtulman (2013), to allow for 
comparisons between those findings and the present study. The coding scheme from Shtulman 
for belief justifications included the four following codes: Non-justifications, Subjective 
justifications, Evidential justifications, and Deferential justifications. From the present coding 
scheme, I combined several codes to fit with that coding scheme, in accordance with how 
Shtulman described each category. Non-justifications included the following codes: 
Clarifications/Qualifications, Don’t Know, No Answer (empty response), and None (explicitly 
stated). Subjective justifications included the following codes: Logical, Moral, Religious, 
Cultural Identity, Experience, Belief-based/Circular, Conspiracy Ideation, Controversy, Natural, 
Personal Choice, Knowledge/Education, and Indifference/Don’t Care. Evidential justifications 
included the following codes: Empirical – Data/Evidence, Empirical – mechanism. Deferential 
justifications included the following codes: Authority – Scientist/Science, Authority – 
Teacher/Class/Textbook, and Authority – Other. The coding scheme from Shtulman for belief 
refutations included the four following codes: Denial, Subjective refutations, Evidential 
refutations, and Deferential refutations. From the present coding scheme, I combined several 
codes to fit with that coding scheme, in accordance with how Shtulman described each category. 
Denial included only the following code: None (explicitly stated). Subjective refutations 
included the following codes: Logical, Moral, Religious, Cultural Identity, Experience, Belief-
based/Circular, Conspiracy Ideation, Controversy, Natural, Personal Choice, 
Knowledge/Education, Indifference/Don’t Care, Counterfactual Hindsight Bias, and Answering 
for Others. Evidential justifications included the following codes: Empirical – Data/Evidence, 
Empirical – mechanism, Empirical – Unrealistic, and Empirical - Methodological. Deferential 
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justifications included the following codes: Authority – Scientist/Science, Authority – 
Teacher/Class/Textbook, and Authority – Other. 
Two coders (E.L. and C.Z.) coded 100% of the data. Initial inter-rater reliability was low 
(Cohen’s κ for Evolution items = .61; Climate Change items = .67, GMO items = .58; Vaccines 
items = .52. This low initial reliability was likely caused by human error due to the number of 
responses (N = 1,912 participant responses comprising 2,392 coded segments), the number of 
codes (21 justification codes, 25 refutation codes), and the iterative nature of the coding scheme. 
Some codes emerged late in the coding process and coders’ revisions sometimes failed to 
account for the new codes (e.g., failure to remove prior, less accurate codes for an item). All 
disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
It should be noted that the coding scheme as presently described could have been parsed 
apart even further. In particular, codes were agnostic to valence. For instance, a response 
segment could get a code for appealing to evidence by claiming evidence exists to support the 
scientific claim or by claiming evidence does not exist to support the scientific claim. This level 
of specification was unnecessary to address the hypotheses listed above, therefore coding the 
open-ended responses at that level of specification was not done at this time. In the same vein, 
the coding scheme does not acknowledge correctness or incorrectness of specific statements of 
fact. In addition to this being unnecessary for addressing the hypotheses, I lack sufficient 
expertise in each of the four scientific domains to be able to determine with high confidence if 
participants’ response were factually correct or not. 
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CHAPTER III: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for level of agreement with the four scientific 
claims, and scores for each of the individual difference measures and relevant demographic 
information. As noted in the Materials section of Chapter II, the Cultural Worldview Scale 
subscales for Hierarchy-Egalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarianism failed to reach 
acceptable standards of internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .59 and .52, respectively) and was 
therefore excluded from analysis (thus, H2c and H4c were unable to be examined). Table 2 shows 
the Pearson Product Moment Correlations between the remaining variables (i.e., the four 
scientific items, the individual difference characteristics, and the demographic variables). 
 
 
Table 1 
Mean Level of Agreement with the Four Scientific 
Claims, and Mean Scores on the Individual Difference 
Characteristics 
 
 Mean SD Range 
Conspiracy Mentality 7.66 1.48 1-11 
REI - Rational 3.66 0.58 1-5 
REI - Intuitive 3.57 0.48 1-5 
Religious Services 2.62 1.44 1-6 
Political Ideology* 3.67 1.82 1-7 
Evolution 4.38 1.48 1-6 
Climate Change 4.37 1.45 1-6 
GMO 4.32 1.53 1-6 
Vaccines 4.33 1.48 1-6 
Note. * Forty participants were removed from this 
analysis because their self-reported political ideology 
was not along the liberal-conservative spectrum. 
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Table 2 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations 
 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Evolution 0.02 0.20* 0.07 -0.18* 0.23* -0.13* -0.08 -0.21* 
2. Climate 
    Change 
  -0.13* 0.13* -0.15* 0.15* -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 
3. GMO     0.15* -0.03 0.19* -0.08 -0.13 -0.28* 
4. Vaccine       -0.13 0.17* -0.11 -0.07 -0.23* 
5. CMQ         -0.03 0.24* -0.06 0.12 
6. REI-R           -0.11 0.05 -0.08 
7. REI-I             -0.09 0.05 
8. Religiosity               0.31* 
9. Political  
    Ideology 
                
Note. * p < .05 
GMO = genetically modified organism; CMQ = Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire; 
REI-R = Rational-Experiential Inventory, Rational Subscale; REI-I = Rational-
Experiential Inventory, Intuitive Subscale 
Political Ideology scored on a 1-7 Likert scale where 1 is Strongly Liberal and 7 is 
Strongly Conservative 
 
 
 
Predictors of Agreement with Scientific Claims 
Canonical correlation analysis was used to assess the relationship between agreement 
with scientific statements and the individual difference and demographic variables. This 
technique allows for the analysis of the relationship between two sets of variables. In canonical 
analysis, synthetic variates for the set of predictor variables and the set of outcome variables are 
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created and analyzed to generate “the highest correlation with the predicted value” of each set of 
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 567). 
The full model across functions was significant, Wilks’s λ = .7, F(20, 641.1) = 3.68, p < 
0.001, producing four functions with squared canonical correlations of .28, .03, .01, and .001, 
respectively. Wilks’s λ is a measure of unexplained variance, with 1 – λ representing how much 
variance is explained by the full model. Therefore, the full model with four functions explained 
30% of the variance, although only the first function, explaining 92.51% of the explained 
variance (or 27.7% of total variance), was significant. All criterion variables were substantial 
contributors to the synthetic criterion variate, possessing standardized coefficients greater than 
|.40| (see Table 3). For the set of predictor variables, only the Rational subscale of the Rational-
Experiential Inventory and self-reported political ideology were substantial contributors to the 
synthetic predictor variate, possessing standardized coefficients greater than |.56|. 
These results supported my hypothesis about the positive relationship between analytical 
thinking and agreement with scientific claims (H1a). My hypotheses about the relationship 
between intuitive thinking, conspiracy ideation, and agreement with scientific claims (H1b-c) 
were not supported. The measures of intuitive thinking style and conspiracy ideation were not 
substantial contributors to the synthetic predictor variate, although their correlations with the 
synthetic predictor variate, the structure coefficient in Table 3, were sizeable and significant (r = 
-.36 and r = -.41, respectively). My hypotheses regarding the relationship between agreement 
with scientific claims and political ideology (H1d-e) were only partially supported. Political 
conservatism was related to lower levels of agreement with scientific claims across all domains, 
whereas political liberalism was related to higher levels of agreement with each claim. My 
hypothesis about the relationship between religiosity and agreement with the evolution item  
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(H1f) was unsupported. The measure of religiosity was nether a substantial contributor to the 
synthetic predictor variate, nor was it significantly correlated with the synthetic variate. 
These results stand in contrast to stereotypical portrayals of particular scientific 
conclusions (e.g., climate change, evolution) being rejected by conservatives, with others (e.g., 
GMO safety, vaccine safety) being rejected by liberals. Participants with stronger conservative 
leanings simply tended to report lower agreement with politicized scientific claims than 
participants with stronger liberal leanings. 
Table 3 
Standardized Function and Structure Coefficients for the First 
Canonical Variate 
 
Predictors  Standardized  Structure  
Conspiracy Mentality -0.29 -0.41** 
REI Rational -0.57* -0.63** 
REI Intuitive -0.22 -0.36** 
Religious Services -0.17 -0.28 
Political Ideology -0.56* -0.70** 
Criteria 
Evolution 0.51* 0.64** 
Climate Change 0.40* 0.40** 
Genetically Modified Foods 0.48* 0.59** 
Vaccines 0.41* 0.57** 
Note. * substantial contributors to the synthetic variate 
** significantly correlated to the synthetic variate 
REI = Rational-Experiential Inventory 
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Belief Justifications 
 Table 4 shows the frequency of belief justification codes. Across all four scientific topics, 
the most frequent justification was a reference to data (21.0% of responses). Responses varied in 
the amount of detail participants provided when describing data. Some responses were specific, 
such as “All the studies related to negative side effects of vaccines have shown that they do no 
damage but protect from viruses” (participant 59) where the participant specifically references 
scientific research on alleged negative side effects of childhood vaccinations. Other participants 
referenced data in a more generic fashion, such as “I do believe in evolution because scientific 
facts make evolution easy to believe in” (participant 12), where the participant does not indicate 
any specific “scientific facts” that make evolution “easy to believe in.” References to data were 
most frequently found in participant responses to the Vaccine item (37.14% of Data codes), and 
least likely to occur in response to the GMO item (17.46% of Data codes). 
 Following appeals to data, qualifications and clarifications were the second most 
common response type (10.1% of responses). These responses merely served to further specify 
the participant’s response rather than justify participant’s responses. An example of this type of 
response is, “I agree that they are largely safe but I don't know if all of them are as effective as 
they state they are” (participant 71). On the subject of the safety and efficacy of childhood 
vaccines, this participant’s response clarifies agreement with safety rather than both safety and 
efficacy. Referencing some empirical mechanism related to the topic (e.g., Participant 90’s 
response to the Climate Change item, “People contribute with the use of oil and coal”) was the 
third most frequently occurring response (9.1% of responses). Belief-based or circular responses 
were the fourth most common response (8.0% of responses). These types of responses also 
occurred as either generic (e.g., “Because it's true”, participant 2 responding to why they hold  
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Table 4 
Frequency of Belief Justification Codes for Four Science Topics  
 
 Topic 
Justification Code Evolution Climate 
Change 
GMOs Vaccines Total 
Non-justification      
   Clarification / Qualification 25 47 50 30 152 
   Don't Know 5 6 33 7 51 
   None (explicitly stated) 1 1 0 0 2 
Subjective      
   Logical 7 2 12 4 25 
   Moral 0 10 13 16 39 
   Religious 69 2 0 1 72 
   Cultural Identity 1 0 9 18 28 
   Experience 1 9 14 36 60 
   Belief-based / Circular 37 30 30 24 121 
   Knowledge / Education 11 13 53 19 96 
   Conspiracy ideation 0 0 11 5 16 
   Controversy 16 4 11 29 60 
   Indifference / Don't care 1 0 0 0 1 
   Natural 0 41 50 2 93 
   Personal Choice 2 0 1 4 7 
Evidential      
   Data 68 75 55 117 315 
   Mechanism 29 62 20 26 137 
Deferential      
   Scientist / Science 21 17 9 13 60 
   Teacher / Class / Textbook 21 9 3 1 34 
   Other 3 10 17 6 36 
Vague 6 6 4 4 20 
Total 324 344 395 362 1425 
No Answer (empty response) 17 22 16 18 73 
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their position on the claim that childhood vaccines are safe and effective) or specific (e.g., 
“Genetically modified foods are safe and can be more beneficial for consumption”, participant 
23) responses. 
 A chi-squared goodness-of-fit analysis was conducted to assess the frequency of response 
types in comparison to the frequency of response types found in prior research (Shtulman, 2013). 
Because the present coding scheme was more nuanced than the coding scheme developed by 
Shtulman (see Figure 1), several categories in the present scheme were combined so that 
comparisons could be made (see Methods section in Chapter II). Results of the chi-squared test 
revealed that the present data significantly differed from the expected frequencies, χ2 (3, 1420) = 
6042.93, p < .001. As shown in Table 5, there was a higher proportion of Non-justifications and 
Subjective responses and a lower proportion of Deferential responses in the present study 
compared to Shtulman’s (2013) study, whereas there was a similar proportion of Evidential 
responses. These results indicate that justifications that could be considered scientifically or 
philosophically appropriate (i.e., Evidential and Deferential) were less frequent than participant 
responses that were either scientifically or philosophically inappropriate (i.e., Subjective) or were 
not justifications. These results support my hypothesis (H2a). 
Table 6 shows the frequency and proportion of participants with justification codes across 
the four topics. What is revealing from these data is how infrequently participants justified their 
beliefs about scientific claims in a consistent manner. Even when looking only at the higher-
order category level, participants were unlikely to justify their beliefs about the four topics the 
same way. Only 19 participants (7.9%) referenced some evidential justification, such as 
empirical data or causal mechanism, in each of their responses to the four scientific claims. 
Thirty-one participants (13%) referenced some subjective justification for all four topics. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Proportions of Justification Types 
Between Shtulman (2013) and Present Study 
 
Justification Type Shtulman (2013) Present Study 
Non-justifications .01 .20 
Subjective .17 .43 
Evidential .29 .28 
Deferential .53 .09 
 
 
 
Examining Tables 4 and 6 together illustrate interesting patterns of belief justification, 
though not all of them are surprising. For instance, 95.6% of justifications referencing religion 
occurred for only one topic. This is not surprising given that, of the four topics presently studied, 
only the topic of evolution has been framed to the general public in a manner that pits science 
against religion. In contrast, appeals to nature were also most likely to occur for only one topic, 
but were split roughly equivalently between the Climate Change and the GMO items. Responses 
that were coded as appeals to nature took one of two forms. One was the naturalistic fallacy, the 
logical fallacy implying that what is natural is better than what is artificial, illustrated in this 
response from participant 194 regarding GMOs, “I feel that food in its most natural state is the 
most nutritious.” The other form appeals to nature took appeared to diminish the significance of 
human activity, as though humans are not able to influence nature. This idea is illustrated in the 
response by participant 281 regarding Climate Change: “I believe that the earth goes through 
periods of climate shift naturally. While humans may not be helping our enviornment [sic], I do 
not believe we are speeding up warming or cooling.” This pattern of appealing to nature is 
somewhat surprising considering vaccines are artificial, and biological evolution occurs  
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Table 6 
Frequency (Proportion) of Participants’ Use of Each Justification Code for None, Any, 
or All Scientific Topics 
 
 0 topics 1 topic 2 topics 3 topics 4 topics 
Non-justification 82 (.34) 86 (.36) 41 (.17) 19 (.08) 11 (.05) 
   Clarification / Qualification 129 (.54) 75 (.31) 29 (.12) 5 (.02) 1 (.00) 
   Don't Know 190 (.79) 47 (.20) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   No Answer (empty response) 208 (.87) 10 (.04) 7 (.03) 7 (.03) 7 (.03) 
   None (explicitly stated) 238 (1.00) 0 (.00) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Subjective 30 (.13) 54 (.23) 64 (.27) 60 (.25) 31 (.13) 
   Logical 215 (.90) 23 (.10) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Moral 200 (.84) 39 (.16) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Religious 170 (.71) 66 (.28) 3 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Cultural Identity 214 (.90) 22 (.09) 3 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Experience 189 (.79) 41 (.17) 8 (.03) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Belief-based / Circular 149 (.62) 63 (.26) 23 (.10) 4 (.02) 0 (.00) 
   Knowledge / Education 162 (.68) 63 (.26) 9 (.04) 5 (.02) 0 (.00) 
   Conspiracy ideation 223 (.93) 16 (.07) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Controversy 188 (.79) 44 (.18) 5 (.02) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 
   Indifference / Don't care 238 (1.00) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Natural 158 (.66) 70 (.29) 10 (.04) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Personal Choice 232 (.97). 7 (.03) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Evidential Justifications 46 (.19) 68 (.28) 65 (.27) 41 (.17) 19 (.08) 
   Data / evidence 69 (.29) 75 (.31) 55 (.23) 30 (.13) 10 (.04) 
   Mechanism 135 (.56) 76 (.32) 23 (.10) 5 (.02) 0 (.00) 
Deferential Justifications 144 (.60) 71 (.30) 17 (.07) 6 (.03) 1 (.00) 
   Scientist / Science 189 (.79) 43 (.18) 5 (.02) 1 (.00) 1 (.00) 
   Teacher / Class / Textbook 211 (.88) 23 (.10) 4 (.02) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Other 207 (.87) 28 (.12) 4 (.02) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Vague 221 (.92) 17 (.07) 0 (.00) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 
 
 
 
naturally. Were people to justify their beliefs more consistently, an appeal to nature should have 
occurred more evenly across topics, regardless of whether participants agreed or disagreed with 
the scientific claim presented, because each topic has a direct connection to concepts of nature. 
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Belief Refutations 
Table 7 shows the frequency of belief refutation codes. In contrast to my prediction that 
the most common refutation response would be denial (H3), the modal refutation response was 
instead an appeal to further evidence, data, or research. As with the justifications, the coding 
scheme developed did not differentiate between referring to evidence generally or specifically. 
Such responses took the form of general appeals to evidence, such as “If there was scientific 
evidence that evolution didn't explain the evolution of species of life” (participant 162), or 
specific appeals to evidence, such as “Proof that the ozone isn't shrinking due to human abuse” 
(participant 37). 
 As with the belief justifications, a chi-squared goodness-of-fit analysis was conducted to 
assess the frequency of response types in comparison to the frequency of response types found in 
prior research (Shtulman, 2013). Results of the chi-squared test revealed that the present data 
significantly differed from the expected frequencies, χ2 (3, 880) = 545.91, p < .001. As shown in 
Table 8, there was a higher proportion of Subjective and Evidential refutations and a lower 
proportion of Deferential refutations in the present study compared to Shtulman’s (2013) study, 
whereas there was a similar proportion of Denial responses. These results refute my hypothesis 
(H4a) that refutations that could be considered philosophically or scientifically appropriate (i.e., 
Evidential and Deferential) would occur less frequently than inappropriate refutations (i.e., 
Denial and Subjective). 
Table 9 shows the frequency with which participants used each code across the four 
topics. Nearly half (49%) of participants explicitly stated that for at least one topic, nothing 
would change their position, with 21% of participants asserting this for more than one topic. 
Interestingly, participants were most likely to explicitly state nothing would change their position  
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Table 7 
Frequency of Refutation Codes for Four Scientific Topics 
 
 Topic 
Refutation Code Evolution Climate 
Change 
GMOs Vaccines Total 
Denial 72 51 25 39 187 
Subjective      
   Logical 0 0 0 0 0 
   Moral 0 0 0 1 1 
   Religious 36 0 0 0 36 
   Cultural Identity 0 2 0 0 2 
   Experience 1 1 5 14 21 
   Belief-based / Circular 0 1 1 0 2 
   Knowledge / Education 14 16 42 8 80 
   Conspiracy ideation 0 1 6 4 11 
   Controversy 1 0 2 3 6 
   Indifference / Don't care 0 0 1 0 1 
   Natural 0 2 0 0 2 
   Personal Choice 0 0 0 0 0 
   Counterfactual hindsight bias 1 21 14 6 42 
   Answering for others 3 1 1 3 8 
Evidential      
   Data 70 95 109 126 400 
   Mechanism 12 11 2 3 28 
   Unrealistic 10 5 0 8 23 
   Methodological 0 0 6 8 14 
Deferential      
   Scientist / Science 5 10 5 5 25 
   Teacher / Class / Textbook 0 0 0 0 0 
   Other 2 4 9 5 20 
Clarification / Qualification 5 4 3 2 14 
Don't Know 9 5 1 1 16 
Vague 6 10 7 5 28 
Total 247 240 239 241 967 
No Answer (empty response) 22 29 27 24 102 
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on the topic of evolution compared to the other topics. A large majority of participants (82%) 
indicated that for at least one topic, some form of evidential challenge to their position would get 
them to consider changing their mind, with 13% of participants stating as much for all four 
topics. Beyond that particular instance, and similar to the belief justification responses, this again 
illustrates the inconsistency with which participants respond when asked about different 
scientific topics. For instance, a religiously based challenge to their belief was referenced by 
15% of participants, and examining Table 7 reveals this type of refutation only applies for 
changing peoples’ minds about evolution. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Comparison of Proportions of Refutation Types 
Between Shtulman (2013) and Present Study 
 
Refutation Type Shtulman (2013) Present Study 
Denial .21 .21 
Subjective .10 .24 
Evidential .30 .50 
Deferential .39 .05 
 
 
 
Although the coding schemes for the belief justifications and belief refutations are nearly 
identical, there are two notable exceptions. First, refutations occasionally took the form of a 
peculiar form of hindsight bias presented as a counterfactual. For instance, Participant 6 
responded to the climate change refutation question that challenging his or her position on  
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Table 9 
Frequency (Proportion) of Participants’ Use of Each Refutation Code for None, Any, 
or All Scientific Topics 
 
 0 topics 1 topic 2 topics 3 topics 4 topics 
Denial 121 (.51) 67 (.28) 38 (.16) 8 (.03) 5 (.02) 
Subjective Refutations 109 (.46) 86 (.36) 24 (.10) 16 (.07) 4 (.02) 
   Logical 239 (1.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Moral 238 (1.00) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Religious 203 (.85) 36 (.15) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Cultural Identity 237 (.99) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Experience 222 (.93) 13 (.05) 4 (.02) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Belief-based / Circular 237 (.99) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Knowledge / Education 181 (.76) 44 (.18) 7(.03) 6 (.03) 1 (.00) 
   Conspiracy ideation 228 (.95) 11 (.05) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Controversy 233 (.97) 6 (.03) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Indifference / Don't care 238 (1.00) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Natural 237 (.99) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Personal Choice 239 (1.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Counterfactual hindsight bias 202 (.85) 33 (.14) 3 (.01) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Answering for others 234 (.98) 4 (.02) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 1 (.00) 
Evidential Refutations 44 (.18) 58 (.24) 65 (.27) 40 (.17) 32 (.13) 
   Data/evidence 50 (.21) 62 (.26) 64 (.27) 42 (.18) 21 (.09) 
   Mechanism 213 (.89) 24 (.10) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Unrealistic 217 (.91) 21 (.09) 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Methodological 227 (.95) 10 (.04) 2 (.01) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Deferential Refutations 208 (.87) 20 (.08) 8 (.03) 3 (.01) 0 (.00) 
   Scientist / Science 223 (.93) 10 (.04) 3(.01) 3 (.01) 0 (.00) 
   Teacher / Class / Textbook 239 (1.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
   Other 223 (.93) 12 (.05) 4 (.02) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Clarification / Qualification 225 (.94) 14 (.06) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Don't Know 223 (.93) 16 (.07) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 
Vague 218 (.91) 17 (.07) 1 (.00) 3 (.01) 0 (.00) 
No Answer (empty response) 197 (.82) 12 (.04) 10 (.04) 10 (.04) 10 (.04) 
 
 
 
climate change would require “If people came together and tried to end climate change.” If taken 
at face value, the logic of this response is that if humans addressed the problem of climate 
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change, this participant would stop believing in anthropogenic climate change. This is somewhat 
of a nonsensical response, because in order to change their position that human activity is a 
factor in climate change, human activity would be needed to reverse the pattern of climate  
change currently observed. Fifteen percent of participants made similar such declarations for at 
least one of the topics. As shown in Table 6, this kind of reasoning occurred at least once for 
each topic, though occurred most frequently in responses to the climate change item. The second 
additional code for the refutation question responses, although it occurred very infrequently, 
emerged because some participants provided refutation responses about what they think would 
change the minds of other people, rather than what would change their mind. 
Predictors of Justification and Refutation Types 
 Multiple regression analyses with participants’ level of agreement with the four scientific 
topics entered as predictor variables and the major qualitative code categories (i.e., non-
justifications, subjective justifications, evidential justifications, deferential justifications, denial, 
subjective refutations, evidential refutations, and deferential refutations) entered as criterion 
variables were conducted to examine whether participants’ level of agreement with each of the 
four scientific claims was related to the types of open-ended responses the provided across all 
four topics (see Tables 10 and 11). Only statistically significant models will be discussed. 
 Participants who included more non-justifications in their responses had lower levels of 
agreement with the climate change and vaccine items, F(4, 234) = 5.44, p < .001. Participants 
who included more evidential justifications in their responses had higher levels of agreement 
with all four scientific claims, F(4, 234) = 12.38, p < .001. Participants who included more 
deferential justifications in their responses had higher levels of agreement with the evolution, 
GMO, and vaccine items, F(4, 234) = 4.69, p = .001. Participants who included more evidential  
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Table 10 
 
Frequency of Justifications Predicted by Level of Agreement with Scientific Claims 
 
 Non-
Justifications* 
Subjective Evidential* Deferential* 
Predictors β t β t β t β t 
Evolution -.10 -1.51 -.13 -1.97 .18 3.04** .18 2.86** 
Climate change -.20 -3.14** .002 .03 .22 3.60*** .08 1.21 
GMO -.04 -.666 -.02 -.35 .21 3.35** .16 2.36* 
Vaccines -.15 -2.33* -.03 -.49 .15 2.51* .02 .24 
Note: N = 239, * p < .05. ** p <.01. *** p < .001 
Regression models with * are significant at p < .05 level 
GMO = Genetically modified organisms 
 
 
 
refutations in their responses had higher levels of agreement with the evolution and climate 
change items, F(4, 234) = 6.59, p < .001. Finally, participants who included more deferential 
refutations in their responses had higher levels of agreement with the climate change item, F(4, 
234) = 2.95, p = .021. 
Taken together, these results illustrate the relationship between participants’ beliefs about 
science and their explicit reasoning about their beliefs. Greater agreement with scientific claims 
corresponds to a higher likelihood of references to objective sources of justification, such as 
evidence or deference to a perceived authority, supporting H2b. A lower level of agreement with 
some scientific claims, specifically claims regarding climate change and vaccines, correspond to 
a higher likelihood of responses that do not actually justify the belief. Likewise, for participant 
responses about possible challenges to their belief, higher agreement with scientific claims, 
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Table 11 
Frequency of Refutations Predicted by Level of Agreement with Scientific Claims 
 
 Denial Subjective Evidential* Deferential* 
Predictors β t β t β t β t 
Evolution -.05 -.83 -.17 -2.62 .22 3.41*** .12 1.78 
Climate change .06 .93 -.08 -1.29 .15 2.34* .13 2.05* 
GMO -.08 -1.19 .04 .65 .12 1.87 .08 1.12 
Vaccines -.02 -.33 .03 .46 .06 .93 .07 1.07 
Note: N = 239, * p < .05. ** p <.01. *** p < .001 
Regression models with * are significant at p < .05 level 
GMO = Genetically modified organisms 
 
 
 
particularly those about evolution and climate change, corresponded to more references to 
objective sources of refutation, such as contradictory evidence or deferring to changing views of 
experts, supporting H4b. These results suggest a connection between agreement with science and 
awareness of what constitutes valid or appropriate reasoning for scientific conclusions. That is to 
say, it is potentially the case that individuals who agree more strongly with scientific claims may 
better understand the epistemological commitments of science better than individuals who 
disagree with scientific claims. 
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CHAPTER IV: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study was designed to expand on prior research on variables that influence 
agreement with scientific claims by examining what reasons people provide for their beliefs on 
politically polarized socio-scientific issues. The gap between how the general public and 
professional scientists accept certain scientific issues, such as those explored here, is large (Funk 
& Rainie, 2015), and efforts to improve acceptance of science by addressing an assumed 
information deficit in the public are not always effective (Gauchat, 2012; Kahan, 2006; Miller, 
2001). Instead, researchers have found better predictors of the acceptance of various scientific 
claims in social, cognitive, and personality variables such as cognitive style, religious affiliation, 
political ideology, and cultural worldview (Gervais, 2015; Kahan 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 
2013a; Lindeman, 2011; Lobato et al., 2014; Majima, 2015; Nisbet et al., 2015; Shen & Gromet, 
2015). One substantial gap in the literature is an examination of the reasons people provide for 
their beliefs regarding scientific conclusions. The present study adds to that literature. 
Findings from this study supported the following hypotheses: (H1a) A greater 
predisposition towards an analytical (i.e., Type 2) cognitive style predicted a higher level of 
agreement with scientific claims; (H2a) For all topics and all levels of agreement, there were 
fewer scientifically acceptable justifications compared to justifications that were not 
scientifically or philosophically acceptable across; (H2b) Higher levels of agreement with a 
scientific claim predicted the use of a scientifically or philosophically acceptable justification; 
and (H4b) Higher levels of agreement with a scientific claim predicted refutations that were 
scientifically or philosophically acceptable. 
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Only partial support was found for the following hypotheses: (H1d-e) Stronger political 
conservatism predicted a lower level of agreement with all four scientific claims relative to 
political liberalism rather than conservatives expressing lower agreement with claims about 
evolution and climate change relative to GMO safety and vaccine safety and liberals expressing 
lower agreement with GMO safety and vaccine safety relative to agreement with evolution and 
climate change. 
No support was found for the following hypotheses: (H1b) A greater predisposition 
towards an intuitive (i.e., Type 1) cognitive style did not predict a lower level of agreement with 
scientific claims; (H1c) A greater predisposition to conspiracy ideation did not predict a lower 
level of agreement with scientific claims; (H1f) More frequent attendance of religious services 
did not predict a lower level of agreement with scientific claims about evolution; (H3) Denial 
was not the most common refutation response; (H4a) Scientifically or philosophically acceptable 
refutations were not less frequent refutation responses than refutations that are not scientifically 
or philosophically. 
The following hypotheses were unable to be examined: (H2c; H4c) Due to low internal 
reliability, I could not use participant scores on the Cultural Worldview Scale to predict their 
justifications and refutations. 
Findings from the canonical correlation analysis showed that lower agreement with all 
four scientific statements was predicted by a low analytical thinking style, as measured by the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (Norris & Epstein, 2013), and self-reported political 
conservatism. However, this result may only hold for politicized scientific topics or topics that 
are considered controversial outside of their respective disciplines, such as the ones studied here. 
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With this cautionary interpretation in mind, the present results do hint at two ways in 
which these topics can be discussed or taught in a manner that may improve agreement with 
scientific consensus. First, educators and pop culture science advocates may wish to present and 
discuss these topics in a way that diminishes any association with a socio-political identity. 
Instead, presentation of these topics could, for instance, only attempt to stick to the data so as not 
to make salient a potentially anti-scientific aspect of one’s individual or group identity. This 
suggestion aligns with the conclusions by Shen and Gromet (2015) regarding framing of a less 
controversial domain of science. They found lower support for the discipline of neurolaw among 
Republicans when the issue was framed in a way that benefits the defense side of criminal law 
than when the issue was framed as benefiting criminal prosecutors or was framed in a neutral 
fashion. The manner in which scientific topics are framed may be more influential in how people 
think about a topic than what the topic itself simply is. Second, the present results imply a need 
for better training and education to encourage people to rely more on a reflective, effortful, 
analytic style of thinking when considering scientific topics. Adopting the perspective of a 
scientist, a profession where reflective and analytical thinking is encouraged, has been linked to 
better performance on physics tasks (Amsel & Johnson, 2008). A more explicit educational 
curriculum that teaches people what thinking like a scientist entails, how to adopt the identity of 
a scientist, and what the culture of science is may be beneficial for improving scientific literacy 
(see also Wynne, 2006). 
Curiously, the Cultural Worldview Scale did not reach acceptable standards of internal 
reliability in the present sample, precluding analysis of the relationship between cultural 
worldview and agreement with scientific claims. The lack of internal reliability for this measure 
is potentially due to differences in sample characteristics between the present sample and those 
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used by Kahan and colleagues (2007, 2009, 2012) when developing the scale. Samples recruited 
in Kahan and colleagues’ studies were either large (exceeding 1,500 participants; see Kahan et 
al., 2007, 2009) or were more representative of the general population than the present sample 
(e.g., Kahan et al., 2009, 2012). By contrast, the present sample size was more modest (N = 244), 
and was comprised of undergraduate students and university staff. Cronbach’s alpha is a 
parameter representing the ratio of the sum of item variance to the total score variance (Streiner, 
2003). A large, heterogeneous sample is more likely to produce high alpha estimates simply 
because heterogeneous samples increase the variance of the total scores. Cronbach’s alpha 
allows researchers to estimate measurement error within a given sample, such that as reliability 
increases the amount of variance attributable to measurement error for the sample decreases 
(Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). This is done by squaring the reliability parameter and subtracting 
from 1. The Cultural Worldview Scale subscale reliabilities were .52 for the Individualism-
Communitarianism subscale and .59 for the Hierarchical-Egalitarianism subscale, resulting in 
variance attributable to measurement error for each subscale as 83% and 65% respectively. I 
considered this unacceptably high and, therefore, was unable to use participants’ scores on 
Cultural Worldview Scale to examine H2c and H4c. 
Beyond providing additional data about the relationship between individual difference 
variables and acceptance or rejection of science, the present study was also designed to help fill a 
gap in the literature on why people hold the beliefs they do about scientific claims (see also, 
Kuhn, 1991). Novel to the present study is a qualitative examination of why people say they 
accept or reject scientific claims. Little research has attempted to investigate this aspect of beliefs 
about science (e.g., Shtulman, 2013), but comparison between prior research and the present 
study can still be made. 
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Shtulman (2013) reported findings that showed people tend to reason about beliefs in 
scientific and various non-scientific (e.g., paranormal, religious) phenomena similarly. Largely, 
participants in his study justified their beliefs by deferring to other sources of information, such 
as authority figures, sacred texts, experts, and teachers. In the present study, participants justified 
their position on scientific claims largely by referring to subjective sources of information, such 
as personal experience (or lack thereof) with the phenomena, their own knowledge (or lack 
thereof) about the topic, circular reasoning, cultural and religious identity, or appeals to nature. 
Referencing some form of empirical source of evidence, such as evidence or causal mechanism, 
was the second most frequent type of response. Additionally, there were significantly more 
clarification and qualification non-justifications in the present study relative to those found in 
Shtulman’s research. These differences in the pattern of results between Shtulman’s research and 
the present study are likely due to the different topics participants responded to. Shtulman 
examined peoples’ justifications for belief in the existence of particular phenomena, such as 
electrons, genes, or evolution. By contrast, here I examined peoples’ justifications for their level 
of agreement with scientific conclusions, such as evolutionary theory being the best current 
explanation for the existence of the variety of species or that medical research has shown that 
childhood vaccinations are largely safe and effective. This difference may predispose people to 
think of the topic in a more complex fashion, because level of agreement with scientific 
conclusions on these topics does have some connection to policy positions people take. These 
socio-scientific issues are related to peoples’ opinions on what material should be taught in 
science classrooms, what kind of industrial regulations or environmental protections should be 
adopted, what kind of information for customers should be provided on food packaging, and 
what kind of healthcare policies for child care should be in place. This may explain the large 
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difference in proportion of clarifications between the two studies. Here, the prompts that 
participants responded to may have primed participants to elaborate more on their specific 
beliefs than what could be conveyed by a simple Likert-response, in contrast to a question 
inquiring about belief in just the existence or non-existence of phenomena. 
Results from this qualitative analysis also demonstrate some of the ways in which 
scientific claims, particularly allegedly controversial claims, are thought of by non-specialists. 
Though participants in this study reasoned across these scientific claims in a largely inconsistent 
fashion, there were topic-specific patterns of reasoning that emerged. For evolution, it was 
common for participants to reference religion in some fashion, both in their justifications for or 
against the claim and in their thinking about possible refutations. On the topic of climate change, 
participants referenced the natural state of the climate. For genetically modified organisms, 
participants commonly made reference to the idea that what is natural is inherently better than 
what is artificial as well as referencing their own level of knowledge regarding the topic. 
Regarding the topic of vaccines, participants commonly made subjective justifications such as 
direct experience and referencing the topic as controversial. Strategies for promoting improved 
scientific literacy should be developed with the awareness of how people think about these 
topics, although it should be noted that the specific wording of the scientific claims used in this 
survey may have differentially primed different ways in which participants responded to the 
open-ended questions. For instance, in the Evolution item, the phrase “best explanation” may 
have primed individuals to think about prospective explanations, of which religiously based 
explanations (e.g., creationism or intelligent design) are commonly associated. For the Climate 
Change item, the phrase “human activity is contributing to” might have primed participants to 
think in terms of causal mechanism. Future research in this area may be able to explore this 
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potential confound by wording scientific conclusions for participants to respond to differently, 
either by being as neutral as possible or by deliberately wording statements in such a way as to 
prime other justifications. 
In sum, the present study is a necessary step towards filling a large gap in the research on 
attitudes and beliefs about science. The research was designed to further investigate individual 
difference variables that might be predict agreement with science, as well as to provide needed 
qualitative research to explore in more detail the reasons people provide for their beliefs about 
scientific topics. An analytical cognitive style and stronger political liberalism were predictive of 
higher agreement with all four scientific claims studied. Higher agreement with scientific claims 
regarding evolution, climate change, GMOs, and vaccines was also related to a greater frequency 
of referencing justifications and refutations that are more scientifically or philosophically valid 
forms of reasoning, such as appealing to evidence or deferring to expertise. Furthermore, 
participants in the present study were found to reason inconsistently across all four topics, 
providing unique clusters of response types for the different topics. Additionally, the findings 
illustrate the need for further qualitative research into the development and maintenance of 
attitudes about science. Being able to tailor education about science to the manner in which 
people think about science may improve scientific literacy, but doing so requires more research 
into why people hold the beliefs they do about science. 
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APPENDIX A: SCIENTIFIC ITEMS SURVEY 
Instructions: This is a brief survey of your own beliefs and attitudes on a variety of subjects of 
public, political, and scientific interest. There are no correct or incorrect answers. We are only 
interested in your opinions about these topics. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with 
the following statements on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 indicates that you do not agree with the 
statement at all and 6 indicates that you completely agree with the statement. After responding to 
each statement, you will be asked to answer two open-ended questions. 
 
1) Biological evolution is the best explanation for explaining the varieties of species of life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(I do not 
agree with 
this statement 
at all) 
    (I agree 
completely 
with this 
statement) 
1a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended) 
1b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]? 
(open-ended) 
 
2) The earth is experiencing a period of global climate change that human activity is contributing 
to.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(I do not 
agree with 
    (I agree 
completely 
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this statement 
at all) 
with this 
statement) 
2a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended) 
2b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]? 
(open-ended) 
 
3) Genetically modified foods (also known as GM or GMO foods) are largely safe for human 
consumption. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(I do not 
agree with 
this statement 
at all) 
    (I agree 
completely 
with this 
statement) 
3a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended) 
3b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]? 
(open-ended) 
 
4) Medical research has demonstrated that childhood vaccinations are largely safe and effective. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(I do not 
agree with 
this statement 
at all) 
    (I agree 
completely 
with this 
statement) 
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4a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended) 
4b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]? 
(open-ended) 
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APPENDIX B: RATIONAL-EXPERIENTIAL INVENTORY (NORRIS & EPSTEIN, 2011) 
Instructions – Please select the response that best corresponds to the way you feel concerning the 
following questions or statements. 
1 I enjoy problems that require hard thinking. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
2 I am not very good in solving problems that require careful logical analysis. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
3 I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
4 I prefer complex to simple problems. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
5 I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
6 Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
7 I am not a very analytical thinker. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
8 I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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9 I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
10 I have a logical mind. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
11 Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
12 Knowing the answer without understanding the reasoning behind it is good enough for me. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
13 I enjoy reading things that evoke visual images. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
14 I enjoy imagining things. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
15 I can clearly picture or remember some sculpture or natural object (not alive) that I think is 
very beautiful. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
16 I identify strongly with characters in movies or books I read. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
17 I tend to describe things by using images or metaphors, or creative comparisons. 
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1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
18 Art is really important to me. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
19 Sometimes I like to just sit back and watch things happen. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
20 I have favorite poems and paintings that mean a lot to me. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
21 When I travel or drive anywhere, I always watch the landscape and scenery. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
22 I almost never think in visual images. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
23 My emotions don’t make much difference in my life. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
24 Emotions don’t really mean much: they come and go. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
25 When I have a strong emotional experience, the effect stays with me for a long time. 
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1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
26 When I’m sad, it’s often a very strong feeling. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
27 Things that make me feel emotional don’t seem to affect other people as much. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
28 Everyday experiences often evoke strong feelings in me. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
29 I’d rather be upset sometimes and happy sometimes, than always feel calm. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
30 I don’t react emotionally to scary movies or books as much as most people do. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
31 My anger is often very intense. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
32 When I’m happy, the feeling is usually more like contentment than like exhilaration or 
excitement. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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33 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
34 I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
35 I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on ones intuition for important decisions. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
36 I trust my initial feelings about people. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
37 I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
38 I enjoy learning by doing something, instead of figuring it out first. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
39 I can often tell how people feel without them having to say anything. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
40 I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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41 For me, descriptions of actual people’s experiences are more convincing than discussions 
about ‘‘facts.’’ 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
42 I’m not a very spontaneous person. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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APPENDIX C: CULTURAL WORLDVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (KAHAN ET AL., 2012) 
A. Individualism  
Instructions – People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making 
decisions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? 
[Possible responses: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, strongly agree]  
1. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.  
2. Sometimes the government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.  
3. It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from themselves.  
4. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.  
5. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting the 
freedom and choices of individuals.  
6. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don’t get in the 
way of what’s good for society.  
B. Hierarchy  
Instructions – People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination. 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?  
[Possible responses: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, strongly agree]  
1. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
2. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.  
3. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people 
of color, and men and women.  
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4. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.  
5. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don’t want equal rights, they want 
special rights just for them.  
6. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine. 
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APPENDIX D: CONSPIRACY MENTALITY QUESTIONNAIRE (BRUDER ET AL., 2013) 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please use the respective rating scale to indicate 
how likely it is in your opinion that the statement is true. Remember that there are no 
“objectively” right or wrong answers and that we are interested in your personal opinion. 
1) I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
certainly 
not 
extremely 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
unlikely somewhat 
unlikely 
undecided somewhat 
likely 
likely very 
likely 
extremely 
likely 
certain 
 
2) I think that politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
certainly 
not 
extremely 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
unlikely somewhat 
unlikely 
undecided somewhat 
likely 
likely very 
likely 
extremely 
likely 
certain 
 
 
3) I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
certainly 
not 
extremely 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
unlikely somewhat 
unlikely 
undecided somewhat 
likely 
likely very 
likely 
extremely 
likely 
certain 
 
 
4) I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
certainly 
not 
extremely 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
unlikely somewhat 
unlikely 
undecided somewhat 
likely 
likely very 
likely 
extremely 
likely 
certain 
 
 
5) I think that there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
certainly 
not 
extremely 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
unlikely somewhat 
unlikely 
undecided somewhat 
likely 
likely very 
likely 
extremely 
likely 
certain 
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APPENDIX E: DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
What is your age? _____ 
 
What is your gender identity?  
 Female 
 Male 
 Other (please specify) 
 
What is your racial/ethnic background? 
 Black, non-Hispanic: A person having origins in any of the Black racial groups of Africa 
(except those of Hispanic origin) 
 Hispanic: A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central, or South America, or 
other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race 
 Asian or Pacific Islander: A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the 
Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent or the Pacific Islands 
 American Indian or Alaskan Native: A person having origins in any of the original 
peoples of North America, and who maintains cultural identification through tribal 
affiliation or community recognition 
 White, non-Hispanic: A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, 
North Africa, or the Middle East 
 Other (please specify) 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
What is your current religious affiliation? 
 Catholic 
 Muslim 
 Jewish 
 Hindu 
 Buddhist 
 Protestant (e.g., Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, etc.) 
 No religion (e.g., atheist, agnostic, etc.) 
 Other (please specify) 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
How frequently do you attend religious services? 
 Never 
 At least once per year 
 At least once per month 
 At least once per week 
 Every day 
 
Overall, which best describes your current political ideology? 
 Strongly liberal 
 Moderately liberal 
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 Mildly liberal 
 Centrist 
 Mildly conservative 
 Moderately conservative 
 Strongly conservative 
 Other (please specify) 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
What is your current political party affiliation? 
 Democratic party 
 Republican party 
 Independent 
 Other (please specify) 
 Prefer not to answer  
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APPENDIX F: CODING SCHEME FOR OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES 
Justification Codes Prototypical Example (Participant #, Topic) 
Non-justification  
   Clarification/Qualification I agree that they are largely safe but I don't know if all of 
them are as effective as they state they are. (P71, Vaccines) 
   Don't Know I don't know anything about GMOs (P8, GMOs) 
   None (explicitly stated) N/A (P303, Evolution & Climate Change) 
Subjective  
   Logical If they were not safe, they would not be put into the public 
(P107, GMO) 
   Moral I agree because we are causing this earth to suffer more than 
what it has already suffer. Its up to us  to change the problem 
that we face in today society. (P183, Climate Change) 
   Religious I am very strong on my religious views and do not believe in 
biological evolution. (P53, Evolution) 
   Cultural Identity I am very involved in nutrition and fitness lifestyles, and I 
haven't heard of many cases of unsafe things happening to 
people because of GMO foods. (P5, GMOs) 
   Experience My only reason for agreeing with this statement is that my 
whole family had childhood vaccinations and believe that it 
has helped us all stay healthy. (P27, Vaccines) 
   Belief-based / Circular Of course we affect our own environment. (P265, Climate 
Change) 
   Knowledge / Education I dont really know anything about this topic. (P51, GMOs) 
   Conspiracy ideation They have banned GMO's in many other countries and 
America is completely ignorant to the horrible effects they 
have because we are governed by a tiny group of people with 
all of the money and power to make us blind and dumb. 
(P135, GMOs) 
   Controversy I honestly have no idea. I can see both sides of the argument 
and cannot seem to make my mind up. (P135, Vaccines) 
   Indifference / Don't care I have been exposed to many scientific and religious 
explanations for how we have gotten to this point in life, and 
quite frankly, it is very overwhelming and I do not care 
enough to form a strong position for that topic. (P82, 
Evolution) 
   Natural modification means processing which will change nature 
food charchteristic (P213, GMOs) 
   Personal Choice I think that vaccines are important for the most part to keep 
kids safe. I think that it is important that it is a choice with 
certain vaccines because there are some vaccines that have 
not been out long enough to have enough research done one 
them and may not be necessary. (P148, Vaccines) 
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Evidential Justifications  
   Data I agree with this statement because of the similarities that we 
as humans have to other animals, as well as how many 
animals are similar but because of where they live or come 
from they have one distinct different feature that does puts 
that at an advantage. (P149, Evolution) 
    Mechanism Without evolution the species would not be able to adapt and 
survive. they need to change and evolve as their environment 
changes (P6, Evolution) 
Deferential  
   Scientist / Science Because scientists have said that this is a problem. (P101, 
Climate change) 
   Teacher / Class / Textbook I am in an Environmental Health class and we learned about 
GMOs, I believe we learned more positives than negatives 
about GMOs. (P125, GMOs) 
   Other News and everyone always encourages kids to get vaccines. 
(P62, Vaccines) 
Vague / Uncodable  
No Answer (empty response)  
 
Refutation Codes Prototypical Example 
Denial My position will not change. (P18, Evolution) 
Subjective Refutations  
   Logical (there were no responses coded with this code) 
   Moral From all the things I have seen and read, it is far safer to 
have the vaccine and perhaps inconclusively suffer some ill 
effect than to allow thousands or perhaps more to die 
needlessly in an outbreak.  We all did fine with all the 
vaccines when we were kids. (P207, Vaccines) 
   Religious Some sort of religious proof would be the only thing that 
would change  my opinion. (P23, Evolution) 
   Cultural Identity Scientific resarch, by actual scientists. Not by political hacks 
or those paid by political hacks, to push an agenda (P281, 
Climate Change) 
   Experience If I or someone close to me has a negative experience with a 
vaccine then I would be more concerned (P55, Vaccines) 
   Belief-based / Circular Well obviously people eat GMO food everyday so I believe 
it is okay to eat but I don't think it's the best option (P68, 
GMOs) 
   Knowledge / Education Getting more information about the topic. (P24, GMOs) 
   Conspiracy ideation I have to do more reading of the scientific literature. Again, 
much of it is funded by the multinational corporations so 
finding unbiased information isn't as easy as with other 
topics. (P240, GMOs) 
68 
   Controversy Looking more into the topic and looking at both sides (P21, 
Vaccines) 
   Indifference / Don't care I would have to read about it, I have never even been 
interested or concerned about it. (P47, GMOs) 
   Natural That the earth is suppose to be going through this period of 
climate change, like it happens every 1 million years or 
something. (P57, Climate Change) 
   Personal Choice (there were no responses coded with this code) 
   Counterfactual hindsight bias If people actually cared enough about the environment and 
taking care of the earth, then there is a possibility of me 
changing my position on this topic. (P58, Climate Change) 
   Answering for others Someone who is religious could argue that God created 
different species. (P175, Evolution) 
Evidential Refutations  
   Data/evidence If there is evidence that says otherwise, then I'll change my 
position. (P144, Climate Change) 
   Mechanism The introduction/propagation of a cohesive theory of the 
development of organisms that is better supported than the 
theory of evolution. (P267, Evolution) 
   Unrealistic If I magically acquired a time machine & I saw otherwise. 
(P1, Evolution) 
   Methodological If several sound studies using large numbers of participants 
had same conclusions indicating questionable effectiveness 
or safety I would possibly be swayed.  (P257, Vaccines) 
Deferential Refutations  
   Scientist / Science If every scientist began saying there was a different reason 
for the Earths temperature rise, then I would change my 
mind. (P125, Climate Change) 
   Teacher / Class / Textbook  
   Other If they were not approved by the FDA. (P181, GMOs) 
Clarification / Qualification This is a topic I am in the middle on. I don't know what 
proof/reason could be provided to provide evidence on either 
side of this argument. (P256, Evolution) 
Don't Know I don't know. (P226, Climate Change) 
Vague / Uncodable  
No Answer (empty response)  
 
